ABSTRACT
INTRODUCTION
ASEAN remains a puzzle to both regional cooperation theorists and most area scholars.
Theorists struggled to explain its decades-long survival in light of continuing intra-mural enmity, competitive, sometimes incompatible state interests, and failure of the association to provide members the benefits neorealists and liberal institutionalists argue justify regional institutional arrangements in Europe (Acharya and Stubbs, 2006) . For instance, the association offers little of the military or material protection against potential territorial encroachment that is central to the neorealist explanation of regional cooperation. There has been no pooling of military capabilities, on the contrary, ASEAN members have deliberately avoided displaying balancing behavior in regional agreements. Moreover, ASEAN instruments do not provide for significant constraints or sanctions in response to non-compliance, which leads to uneven, inadequate implementation (Narine, 1997; Nesadurai, 2003; ASEAN, 2006; Ravenhill, 2008; Koh et al., 2009; Cockerham, 2010; Jones, 2015; Pennisi Di Floristella, 2015) .
The peculiar, informal, sovereignty-centered regional policy-making processes that characterize the so-called "ASEAN Way" have been both blamed for these shortcomings and credited for the association"s successes. Some argue that the association"s efforts at building consensus and confidence among its heterogeneous membership helped manage the numerous intra-mural conflicts and facilitated continuing cooperation (Kurus, 1993a; Jetly, 2003; Kivimäki, 2012) . Constructivists even suggest that enduring political commitment to ASEAN procedures and basic norms shape an emerging regional identity (Acharya, 2009) . Others however claim that insistence on sovereign rights and seeking of consensus delay regional action and lead to outcomes which inevitably reflect the lowest common denominator; the result is an organization that is powerless to elicit compliance from unwilling member governments, which makes "process, not progress", little more than a "neighborhood watch group" (Hund, 2002; Jones and Smith, 2007; Ravenhill, 2008) .
Notwithstanding the centrality of regional decision-making processes to explaining ASEAN cooperation, scholars seldom went beyond presenting the various formal and informal procedures, examining their consequences in relation to particular aspects of cooperation, or acknowledging their role in serving the interests of governments. The aim of this article is to provide an in-depth assessment of the evolution of regional decision-making actors and practices and examine the extent of the changes provided for by the ASEAN Charter. It looks at the role these practices play in achieving the objectives member governments set for the association and outlines the endurance of the basic policy-making cycle negotiated in late 1960s -early 1970s. The paper starts with an examination of the purpose of the association, proceeds by examining the formal procedures and institutions established to achieve it, and continues with a discussion of various unwritten norms of behavior. The conclusion outlines the implications of the continued relevance of this process to fulfilling ASEAN objectives.
ASEAN'S PURPOSE: GUARD REGIONAL GOVERNMENTS AGAINST UNWANTED INTERFERENCE IN INTERNAL AFFAIRS
There is general agreement among regional observers that ASEAN was set up in 1967 in order to guard internal political stability within member states against both intra-regional and external interference (Shee, 1977; Kurus, 1993b; Acharya, 1998; Narine, 1998; Funston, 2000; Ba, 2009; Nesadurai, 2009 ). As such, regional institutions were established to fulfill two apparently contradictory functions. On one hand, persisting vulnerability of governments to internal and external threats, coupled with outstanding regional rivalries, mandated an emphasis on national sovereignty, as a guarantee against unwanted interference from both regional institutions as well as fellow members (Narine, 1997; Severino, 2006; Ravenhill, 2008; Acharya, 2009; Cockerham, 2010) . On the other hand, leaders had a strong common interest in consolidating regional cooperation and keeping interstate tensions under control, as they regarded intra-regional tensions as likely to lead to much feared great power intervention within the region (Shee, 1977; Ramcharan, 2000) .
As ASEAN institutions were expected to simultaneously protect sovereignty and enhance regional cooperation among rival states, confidence-building emerged as a fundamental objective of regional cooperation (Shee, 1977; Narine, 1998; Ba, 2009) . Leaders understood that building confidence was instrumental to preventing intra-mural military conflicts and facilitating agreement on issues of common concern. These, in turn, were crucial not only for the survival of the organization, but also for its ability to project an image of relative regional unity and acquire the credibility necessary to play a role in the management of regional affairs, and fend off unwanted external intervention.
This concern with building confidence and managing conflicts among the political elites of member states translated at the regional level into a strong emphasis on both state sovereignty (and its corollary non-interference in internal affairs of fellow members) as well as ASEAN unity/solidarity (Collins, 2007; Ba, 2009) . Regionally, this meant decision-making powers remained firmly under the control of member governments; while emphasis on informality and building personal relations among ASEAN officials worked to facilitate consensus. Institutional and normative frameworks evolved along these lines and, as Alan Collins aptly pointed out, the association continues to function as a "support network for the governing elite" (Collins, 2007) .
ASEAN'S FORMAL DECISION-MAKING RULES AND PROCEDURES
Decision-making rules and norm creation are a crucial aspect of regional cooperation arrangements as they reflect the degree of control member states are willing to delegate to supranational institutions. Haftel and Thompson (2006) international organizations from narrow state interests is partly a function of "the number of states required to control decision making" and "how closely these decision makers are tied to national interests". Bearing in mind that governing elites have never envisioned ASEAN as an autonomous regional grouping, the next section examines decision making procedures along two dimensions:
"how" decisions are made and "who" makes them.
Decision-Making Based on Consultation and Consensus
The diversity of views and interests among governing elites, along with outstanding territorial and political disputes, meant that cooperation could only progress at "a pace comfortable to all" and decisions had to be made through consensus (Severino, 2006) . Reaching consensus however remained a challenging task. On one hand, controversial issues needed to be discussed and kept in check in order to prevent them from escalating and disrupting regional dialogue (Jetly, 2003) . On the other hand, public discussion of these matters would be dangerous in itself, as leaders would have a strong incentive to adopt a hardline in order to satisfy domestic audiences (Haacke, 2003; Koh et al., 2009) . ASEAN elites thus made clear their preference for informality and quiet diplomacy from the very beginnings of the association, and regional bodies evolved to facilitate consensus by encouraging elite socialization.
Consensus-based decision-making enables any member at any time to veto any regional proposal that is perceived as threatening to national interests. It does not imply unanimity per se, nor does it involve voting, as not all members need to explicitly agree with the proposal under discussion; however, it does require enough support to endorse adoption of a proposal (a specific number is not mentioned in ASEAN documents) and that no member votes against it Severino (2006) . In case of a deadlock, members resort to bilateral negotiations. This effectively places the specific conflict of interests outside the ASEAN framework, which in turn facilitates the progress of regional negotiations on other issues.
Consensus decisions are arrived at through consultations between governments. Many ASEAN observers depict the association"s decision-making process as inspired by the traditional Malay practice of mushawarah (consultation) and mufakat (consensus) (Kim and Lee, 2011) . This system was used by Malay leaders to manage personal relations with the chiefs of peripheral political centers in order to avoid resorting to force. Musharawah takes place among friends and neighbors, not opponents, and it involves intensive discussions where participants are expected to adjust their points of view and the majority does not impose its will on the minority (Kim and Lee, 2011) .
There are two additional decision-making formulas employed within ASEAN: the "ASEAN minus X" and the "X+2". The use of these procedures is restricted to the area of economic cooperation and is aimed at speeding up the process of integration by allowing willing members to integrate at a faster pace than the general consensus would dictate (ASEAN, 2007a) . Such practices do not impinge on ASEAN"s general rule of decision-making through consensus, since cooperation continues at "a pace comfortable to all", and agreements only enter into force in relation to states that signed and ratified them. between two or more ASEAN member states. Though these documents do not strictly belong to ASEAN affairs, as they are negotiated outside the association"s framework, they do serve the grouping"s overall purpose of enhancing regional economic integration. Rodolfo Severino concludes that policy documents adopted under these rules may serve to reduce the pressure for economic reform on member governments, but also hold the potential to undermine ASEAN"s "sense of community" (Severino, 2006) .
Decision-Makers Before and After the ASEAN Charter
ASEAN"s founding document did not include reference to any specific norms of behavior and established a regional "machinery" amounting to little more than a forum for discussions among the five Southeast Asian foreign ministers. It consisted of an Annual Meeting of Foreign Ministers (AMM); a Standing Committee (chaired by the foreign minister of the host country, consisting of member states" ambassadors to the hosting country) tasked to carry out the work of the association between AMMs; Ad-hoc and permanent committees; and a national secretariat within each member state that would "service" the first two groups (ASEAN, 1967) . There was no elaboration of AMM"s powers and functions, and the declaration was equally vague on the role of the Standing Committee.
The joint communiqués of ASEAN"s Ministerial Meetings, the only official public insight into the regional grouping"s inner workings during its early years, help clarify the various roles played by these organs.
1 By 1972, there were at least eleven ASEAN Permanent Committees covering various functional aspects of cooperation, including food production and supply, civil air transportation, shipping, air traffic services and meteorology, cultural activities and finance. 2 These consultations were closely supervised and coordinated by the Standing Committee, which in turn would report to the AMM on the progress of negotiations and recommend future action. 3 The AMM would discuss the progress achieved, decide on the recommendations made, and formulate additional instructions and guidelines for the other regional organs.
Notwithstanding the fact that they only met once a year in an official setting, it is difficult to overestimate the involvement of ASEAN foreign ministers in the work of the association. by the foreign minister of the hosting country and its membership consisted of diplomats. 4 The Standing Committee"s key role in facilitating consensus, coordinating and supervising the work of the various committees, and its obligation to report to AMM ensured that foreign ministers remained engaged in the association"s affairs between the annual AMMs. Figure 1 is an outline of the relationship among the various regional bodies engaged in ASEAN decision-making/policy formulation during the first decade of cooperation.
Figure-1. ASEAN"s early policy-making cycle
Source: This information was compiled by the author based on texts of the 1967 Bangkok Declaration and AMM joint communiqués from 1968, 1969, and 1972 , all of which are made available on ASEAN"s website at http://asean.org/.
The impetus to strengthen and/or expand regional institutions generally came in response to several factors, in particular: external developments perceived as common threats that caused an upsurge in intra-mural unity; attempts to legalize entrenched cooperation practices; and/or efforts to improve coordination and encourage implementation of existing commitments (Kurus, 1993a; Nesadurai, 2003; Elliott, 2003; Severino, 2006) . As a result, subsequent revisions of the regional institutional structure added to this main framework and sometimes helped clarify its functions, but it did not alter the policy-making cycle, nor did it interfere with the consensusbuilding process. The regional developments the Charter fails to endorse are telling as they reflect continued resistance to delegating powers to regional bodies and commitment to the long-standing ASEAN diplomatic protocol. In particular, the Charter does not mention the ASEAN Troika in relation to intra-mural dispute settlement, nor does it include any reference to the now regular ASEAN foreign ministers" retreats (Funston, 2000; Ramcharan, 2000; Haacke, 2003) . There are also no provisions on transparency of regional institutions. ASEAN meetings continue to be held behind closed doors and, apart from occasional statements from government officials, joint declarations remain the main insight into proceedings. 6 The ACC and the APSC Council each meet at least twice/year, while the AMM has at least one annual meeting. The ASEAN Charter provides that the ACC and the AMM are both comprised of member states" foreign ministers. It also requires states to appoint a representative to every Community Council (Article 9.3). In conformity with this provision, states assigned their foreign ministers to represent them in the APSC Council (with the exception of Indonesia, who appointed its Minister of Foreign Affairs only as an alternate member).
Figure-2.
Regional policy-making cycle according to the ASEAN Charter Source: This information was compiled by the author based on the provisions of the ASEAN Charter, in particular articles 7, 8, 9, 10, and 12. 
NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY, ASEAN UNITY/SOLIDARITY, AND INFORMAL RULES OF BEHAVIOUR
Just like the association"s institutional framework, informal rules of behaviour were negotiated and evolved gradually, in response to pressure to act as a united front or as a result of increased confidence. In late 1960s, the five essentially rival anti-communist governments which founded the association (Thailand, Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Singapore) could only agree on an occasional forum to discuss economic cooperation (ASEAN, 1967) . Strict commitment to respecting each other"s sovereign rights, though fundamental to enabling cooperation, was not sufficient to reassure the relatively weaker states that stronger fellow members will refrain from using the association to further their own interests (ASEAN, 1976a; 1976b) . Thus Indonesia"s attitude, as the largest, strongest member state, was instrumental for ASEAN"s survival during the first decades, as the Jakarta government displayed willingness to compromise and resisted imposing its will on weaker fellow members (Anwar, 1994) .
The Frontline State Principle/Concept
During early 1980s, when ASEAN members were negotiating a common position on Vietnam"s invasion of Cambodia (then Kampuchea), Jakarta acknowledged Bangkok"s higher stakes in the conflict, put aside its own strategic preferences, and allowed Thailand to assume a leading role in formulating ASEAN policy on the issue (ASEAN, 1979; Alagappa, 1993) .
Observers suggest that the Suharto government overcame its resentment for the Thai policy on Kampuchea out of concern for Indonesia"s long-term interests in the survival of ASEAN (Alagappa, 1993; Narine, 1998) . the association"s unity and reflects their vision of the organization as a "support network" for governments and as a vehicle to influence regional affairs. It achieves that by sending a clear signal that, when they are most vulnerable to external events, regional governments can count on fellow ASEAN members for support. This creates a sense of solidarity, builds trust, and reveals ASEAN"s utility to governing elites.
This attitude appears to have generally continued after the Cold War, as Nischalke mentions the principle in relation to the association"s response to the 1995 Mischief Reef crisis, when it was discovered that Beijing had occupied an area claimed by the Philippines (Nischalke, 2000) . At the time, ASEAN foreign ministers rallied behind Manila and, after an initial joint statement calling for peaceful resolution of the conflict, agreed to confront China during an informal senior officials meeting (Nischalke, 2000) . This display of ASEAN unity proved somewhat effective, as China abandoned its preference for bilateral talks, conceding to discuss the situation with ASEAN collectively during the ASEAN Regional Forum. Commitment to this principle could also help explain the association"s support for Indonesia during the crisis in East Timor as well as member states" willingness to follow Thailand"s policy of "constructive engagement" towards Myanmar (Buszynski, 1998; Dupont, 2000) .
Consensus, Informality, and Forging Close Interpersonal Relations
Notwithstanding the willingness of some ASEAN governments to sometimes put aside their short-term interests in order to safeguard their long-term stake in the survival of the association, maintaining regional cohesion has always been a challenge. Members shared a deep sense of insecurity, in relation to external powers as well as internal insurgencies, which generated a common self-perception of vulnerability (John, 1994) . 9 This greatly facilitated agreement on the need to cooperate during the early years of the regional grouping, and continues to fuel ideas on the importance of presenting a united front in relation to outside powers (Ba, 2009; Koh et al., 2009) .
Nonetheless, ASEAN governments started as relative rivals, with deep distrust of each other and outstanding territorial conflicts, most of which remain unsolved and continue to affect regional relations (Anwar, 1994; Severino, 2006; Ba, 2009; Roberts, 2012) . ASEAN"s expansion in late 1990s (to include Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam and Myanmar) and Indonesia"s democratization following the collapse of the Suharto regime in 1998 significantly reinforced and even exacerbated intra-mural conflicts (Katsumata, 2003; Severino, 2006; Nesadurai, 2009; International Crisis Group, 2011; Chachavalpongpun, 2012) .
9 Thailand was never a formal colony, but its early state formation was heavily influenced by neighboring colonial powers. It was for instance The informal nature of the regional consultation process, along with the regularity and frequency of ASEAN-related meetings at various government levels, allows ASEAN leaders and officials to familiarize with each other, contributing significantly to building trust and facilitating consensus (Haacke, 2005; Koh et al., 2009; Tan, 2013) . Even when leaders learn about each other without necessarily bonding, the regional socialization process could function as a "safety net", former Singapore Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew explained:
"Thus, when an official spoke loudly, his counterpart would have known from long association that he was one to speak loudly anyway, whether happy or angry, and thus, knowing that there was no significance in it, would not get unduly excited." (Antolik, 1990 ).
According to ASEAN officials themselves, the relative comfort and trust that close personal relations bring to the negotiating table have been instrumental in reaching consensus over the ASEAN Charter (Koh et al., 2009; Pibulsonggram, 2009) . Members of the HLTF acknowledge that their familiarity with one another and their strong we-feeling, as members of the same "ASEAN family", allowed them to put-aside long-standing divisions over some key issues. This sense of familiarity among ASEAN officials at various government levels is built through a considerable number of regular regional meetings. Thus, by 2013, the meager regional machinery set up by the 1967 Bangkok Declaration evolved into more than 600 ASEAN-related activities on issues ranging from security cooperation and relations with external partners to science and technology, tourism and transportation (ASEAN Secretariat, 2013; 2014) .
The important role these meetings play in facilitating consensus is clear when one considers that in the first 25 years of cooperation the Summit had only been convened 4 times, while member countries concluded no less than 74 treaties/agreements (ASEAN Secretariat, 2012). Antolik shows that by 1990 the Senior Officials Meeting (SOM), an institution which evolved outside the ASEAN structure, had become "the de facto political coordinating committee of the ASEAN process" (1990) . The advantages of negotiating sensitive political issues through SOMs are clear. First, such meetings are free from the pressure and expectations that accompany highly visible summit or ministerial dialogues, allowing divisive issues to be discussed openly without affecting ASEAN"s image or the leaders" domestic standing (Antolik, 1990; Ben-Dor and Dewitt, 1994 (Nischalke, 2000) .
CONCLUSION
This article provides a detailed account of both decision-making and decision-makers within that early decision-making practices were mostly reinforced by later institutional and normative developments. The endurance of the strictly intergovernmental nature of decision-makers, consensus decision-making, as well as the informal manner consultations are being conducted underscores the importance of these procedures to regional cooperation.
This system has been both credited for the association"s contribution to regional peace and stability, and blamed for its limited capacity to act. ASEAN scholars agree on the reactionary nature of institution-building and the scarcity of political will in pursuing policy harmonization and regional integration (Narine, 1997; Severino, 2006; Jones and Smith, 2007) . This in turn leads to a host of issues in terms of the efficiency of regional institutions, widely recognized by both academics and officials. Such issues include, among others: vaguely formulated agreements, allowing for different interpretations and lacking effective enforcement mechanisms; incompatible interests and policies render political and security cooperation superficial; implementation of regional commitments remains uneven and dependent on the will of individual governments (Narine, 1997; Nesadurai, 2003; Ravenhill, 2008; Cockerham, 2010; Jones, 2015; Pennisi Di Floristella, 2015) .
The view presented here is that both these perspectives represent two sides of a coin and reflect the contradictory purposes the association is set up to pursue: consolidate sovereignty and enhance cooperation. The implication is that, insofar as they manage intra-mural conflicts and facilitate cooperation without limiting sovereignty, ASEAN institutions achieve their goals. Moreover, continuing endorsement of the traditional policy-making mechanism provides a valuable insight into member governments" cost-benefit calculations, as the gains in ASEAN cohesion are seen to be worth the significant costs.
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